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Abstract
In Noise: A Flaw in Human Judgment (2021), Daniel Kahneman, Olivier Sibony, and Cass R. Sunstein
convincingly demonstrate the pervasiveness and harmfulness of unwanted internal variability or noise.
Using examples from both public and private sectors to demonstrate the quality and limits of the
judgments we make, they argue that, despite objections based on possible cost, difficulty, and
dehumanization, the reduction of noise is imperative for the fairness and equitability of systems upon
which we depend.
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Variation in professional and institutional judgments made about cases which are
very similar to one another is clearly unwanted. Objectivity and consistency are the
declared standards for judgments of great consequence, for in their absence is seen
sometimes disastrous outcomes for affected individuals, as well as the replacement
over time of the respective institutions’ credibility with mistrust. For example,
certain patterns of unfairness are not unexpected in our criminal justice system, and
we know that bias can lead to error and bad judgments (Kahneman 2011).
Systemic bias, or system-wide deviations in the judgment and treatment of
members of certain groups and classes, should not, however, be confused with
another phenomenon of inconsistent outcomes which deserves its own
examination: when, on the smaller, individual, or institutional level, there occurs
“undesirable variability in judgments of the same problem.” That is the broader
definition for “noise” used by Daniel Kahneman, Olivier Sibony, and Cass R.
Sunstein in their 2021 book Noise: A Flaw in Human Judgment, hereafter Noise.
Many readers will already be familiar with concepts from Kahneman’s
monumental 2011 book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, which summarized much of his
life’s research and has, since the time of its publication, enjoyed a canonical status
in the field of judgment and decision making.1 It treats two different systems of
thinking we all shift back and forth between depending on circumstances. One of
these systems—system 2—requires time, deliberation, and self-control, but yields
best results. System 1, however, is fast and easy, yet is much more error-prone in
that it is governed largely by biases, fallacies, and heuristics. Noise is something of
a coda to Thinking, Fast and Slow, which examines the remaining impediments to
good and consistent decision making which cannot be fully explained just by
cognitive biases and the like. Kahneman has also stated in interviews that Noise
may be a bit rushed or premature, but he knew that as a man in his upper 80s he
would not get to continue honing it for another 15 years. Although some of this
rushed quality may show itself, the book still makes important points worthy of our
consideration.
Using examples drawn from medicine, the judicial system, and business,
Kahneman, Sibony, and Sunstein convincingly demonstrate the pervasiveness and
harmfulness of unwanted internal variability or noise. Deciding rightly can be hard
because there is always some uncertainty about an answer and reasonable people
often disagree. Some disagreement is to be expected, but how much internal
inconsistency with one’s own previous decisions upon similar cases will we allow
before increasing discipline and uniformity in the judgment process to reduce noise
and minimize unwanted variability?
Kahneman and his co-authors make clear that the need to reduce this
variability, or noise, is reserved for professional judgments where inconsistency
1
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creates problems. Indeed, there are times when diversity of judgments is welcomed
and expected; we would be disappointed if movie critics all agreed or political
pundits shared the same opinions. Diversity of ideas is also important in the process
of generating a multitude of possible solutions to problems before then pitting these
ideas against each other to identify the best among them. But the focus of this book
is not minimizing personal taste or preventing good brainstorming; rather it is
maximizing the effectiveness of professional judgments, thereby strengthening
systems where stability and consistency are expected. To strengthen these systems
and improve judgments, we need to understand how accurate our judgments really
are. The authors begin by looking at predictive and evaluative judgments and the
processes which underlie them.
Predictive judgments are verifiable: their accuracy can be determined based on
whether they match actual outcomes. For examples, the authors use the effects of a
medication, the course of a pandemic, and the result of an election. Not all
judgments are verifiable, especially evaluative judgments, such as the sentences
imposed by a judge. These cannot be compared to outcomes. In these cases, we
must consider the quality of the judgment’s processes and underlying mechanisms
to infer any conclusions about the accuracy or quality of the judgment itself. This
requires measuring noise as it exists.
A method the authors use for identifying and measuring noise is the noise audit.
An example is for different individuals or departments to compile sample billing
estimates for identical lists of goods and services, and then for these estimates to be
compared against one another. The average is of interest, but even more is each
estimate’s deviation from the average, and this deviation should ideally be lower
rather than higher. Which is to say, an accurate average of the estimates is not
necessarily a great cause for celebration if it was achieved by one unacceptably
high-cost estimate cancelling another which is unacceptably low.
Noise audits can measure the volume of noise—the amount by which instances
or judgments vary from the average; they also reveal the many different types of
noise. It is important to remember that these various noises can coexist and that
their effect is cumulative. This may be a good place in the review to define several
of the authors’ many terms, which in the book are helpfully diagrammed in an
organizational chart. An error in judgment can come from bias—which is not to be
confused with noise—or system noise, the latter of which they define as undesirable
variability in judgments of the same case by different people. This is made up of
level noise and pattern noise. Level noise is the variability in the average level of
judgments by different people and is attributed to differences in disposition or
personality. The authors note that some judges are more severe and some
forecasters are more optimistic. Pattern noise is the variability in responses to a
scenario. This pervasive noise is hard to detect and is made of stable pattern noise
and occasion noise and reflects a complex pattern in the attitudes of individuals
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toward a particular situation. For example, a judge may be more lenient than others
in general but harsher when the offender is a teenager if they believe it is in the
defendant’s best interest. The authors do explain the workings of these several
varieties and subsets of noise, but at times a reader may find it all difficult to
manage.
Occasion noise, this last category again, is variability due to transient effect,
such as when an individual’s own judgment varies from previous similar instances.
Sources of occasion noise include mood, stress, fatigue, and even weather. This
reviewer found the authors’ examples of occasion noise especially fascinating, as
these demonstrate how decisions regarding even matters of greatest importance can
be swayed by circumstances which one would hope were trifling or irrelevant.
Changes in mood, stress, and fatigue can all modify our cognitive machinery—and
it is startling to see that physicians are demonstrably likelier to prescribe opioids at
the end of the day. And, although it is likely mediated by mood, even weather
influences professional judgments: college admissions officers pay more attention
to academic attributes on rainy days than sunny days when they pay more attention
to non-academic attributes! Such seemingly accidental factors, however, often go
unnoticed, unnoted, and thus unmeasured. Meanwhile, not only are we failing to
acknowledge possible flaws in our decision making; we tend to inflate its rightness
by retroactively justifying our judgment.
When people make judgments, they tend to use (and sometimes even create)
reasons that justify their points of view and then defend those points of view with
what they are satisfied are convincing arguments, searching for information that
fits their beliefs and ignoring information that does not fit (i.e., confirmation bias).
They tend to stick to their judgments, too. This commitment can bring with it a
degree of attention and scrutiny which helps maintain consistency over time.
Moreover, when we make multiple similar judgments, if we average those
judgments, we tend to be even more accurate. Sticking to our judgments can be
good, then: we are more consistent with ourselves than we are with others. Even
still, as we have seen, sometimes our judgments reflect factors such as attitudes and
mood which make us more error-prone, and it is during such shifts in attention that
system 1-type errors can further compound poor decision making.
The amount of available relevant information and our ability to make our way
through it and use it, our beliefs, and even our mood, are all factors which can either
mitigate or facilitate the influence of system 1 errors—i.e., those resulting from
biases, fallacies, and heuristics—on our judgment. System 1 operates quickly and
requires less cognitive effort than system 2, with which we are less likely to make
mistakes. But system 2 requires sustained attention, which can be depleted by
difficult cognitive reasoning and changes in self-control. This is when we fall back
on system 1. System 1 thinking is governed by biases, fallacies, and heuristics,
which increase the likelihood of incorrect judgments. The authors of Noise devote
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a chapter to explaining the relationship between bias and noise. We are prone to
disregard noise and wrongly attribute all errors and undesirable outcomes to
bias. This tendency is sloppy and does not allow us to focus on the nature of bias;
although both bias and noise can be present (and all psychological biases can create
noise), we can begin correcting for these only when we appreciate their different
natures.
Considering the factors that influence judgments, including stress and fatigue,
our beliefs and attitudes, and willingness to accept risk, this author is reminded of
signal detection theory. Similarly, signal detection theory assumes that nearly all
decisions and judgments happen in the presence of some uncertainty, and signal
detection theory provides a way to analyze how judgments happen in the face of
that uncertainty. For example, consider looking for a tumor on a CT scan; it is
difficult, and there is always degree of uncertainty. We can imagine a two-by-two
array of two conditions which produce four possibilities: whether you see a tumor
or you do not; and whether a tumor in fact exists or it does not: each of the four
possible outcomes carries its own incentives and disincentives. Statisticians call
two of these four possibilities Type I errors (a false-positive) and Type II errors (a
false-negative). How people respond to variability in what they see—perceptual
uncertainty—is often contrasted with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972) well-known
theory regarding how people respond to variability in the value of a decision
outcome. Signal detection theory and the major studies authored or co-authored by
Kahneman have remained isolated from one another, but synthesizing them may
strengthen our understanding of noise and, ultimately, how to turn it down. As the
authors of Noise point out, medicine is noisy, and that is necessarily the case in
signal detection models and in this example. The choice of a criterion, or a value of
sensory intensity that serves as a threshold for saying a signal is present, could
depend on a combination of factors that influence matters of judgment described in
Noise. These factors include past experience, relevant extant knowledge, and the
confidence which comes with expertise—none of which, unfortunately, necessarily
make us better at judgment.
Kahneman and his co-authors do note that some people are better at making
judgments. They are less noisy and make less biased decisions, they are more
intelligent and open-minded, and they want to be corrected; what one knows, how
well one thinks, and what one thinks all matter. Good judges are often experts, or
highly skilled people whose superiority over others is verifiable as a result of
availability of outcome data. Yet experts can also be too easily swayed by feelings
of satisfaction. The authors show how experts become accustomed to experiencing
such a feeling of satisfaction upon completion of a decision to which their expertise
has been applied. Noise co-authors call this intuition, or “knowing without knowing
why.” This mere feeling, however, is mistaken for a belief or certainty in the
correctness of the decision, which in turn can produce just as many mistakes as no
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expertise at all. (The point here is not that experts are not any better; it is that
overconfident experts who do not know the limits of their expertise are not any
better.) Additionally, in an attempt to make the world and our sense of agency
within it more understandable and predictable, we are forever shoehorning events
and decisions into satisfying narratives of causality. We stop searching our memory
for causes and explanations as soon as we find the first thing which seems
plausible. Because these sought explanations are necessarily found in retrospect or
hindsight, we come away from such exercises with an overestimation of our ability
to predict outcomes.
Statistical thinking, mechanical models, and algorithms are means by which
we can reduce the effects of noise and thereby outperform experts. This happens
because the many complex rules and subtleties which we see as uniquely human
and proof of expertise often just get in our way. Instead, as the quantity of quirks
and subtleties get fewer so too does the amplitude of noise, while accuracy of
judgment goes up. Despite this, many people object to these tools, arguing that their
use is dehumanizing, mechanical and inimical to individuals. Noise authors are not
arguing for the mechanization of judgment: they are acknowledging the prevalence
of noise and making a case for reducing it to improve judgment.
The authors propose several strategies to reduce bias and noise. The task of
identifying biases can be assigned to one of several different auditors: an observer
who could be a supervisor attending to the process of decision making and team
dynamics; a member of a team whose job it is to remind the team of biases that may
mislead them; or an outside facilitator. A checklist of biases people are attempting
to detect cannot possibly be exhaustive, as there are an infinite number of possible
biases, but it can certainly help in the identification of a few which have been shown
to be especially problematic. Much harder to identify than biases are noise and
sources of noise, as the authors demonstrate throughout the book. It is ultimately
more efficient to prevent noise before it occurs than to work around it and correct
for it after it has clouded one’s data. And the benefits of reducing noise are not
visible; you may never know what problems you prevented. This endeavor is
nevertheless invaluable, and the authors propose and describe a protocol to aid in
noise prevention.
In the six sections of this book, Kahneman, Sibony, and Sunstein provide
insight into the seldom-acknowledged problem of noise. They distinguish between
noise and bias and use examples from both public and private sector to demonstrate
the quality and limits of the judgments we make. They convincingly argue that,
despite objections based on possible cost, difficulty, and dehumanization, the
reduction of noise is imperative for the fairness and equitability of systems upon
which we depend. This book, which is accessible to laypeople but also offers
important insight for experts, is essential reading.
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